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Abstract
Secure networks rely upon players to maintain security
and reliability. However not every player can be assumed
to have total loyalty and one must use methods to uncover
traitors in such networks. We use the original concept of
the Byzantine Generals Problem by Lamport [8], and the
more formal Byzantine Agreement describe by Linial [10],
to find traitors in secure networks. By applying general
fault-tolerance methods to develop a more formal design
of secure networks we are able to uncover traitors amongst
a group of players. We also propose methods to integrate
this system with insecure channels. This new resiliency
can be applied to broadcast and peer-to-peer secure com-
munication systems where agents may be traitors or be-
come unreliable due to faults.
Keywords: Byzantine agreement, distributed systems,
fault tolerance, message authentication, secure Commu-
nication
1 Introduction
A reliable communications system must be able to cope
with failure of one or more of its components. Users
within a communications network can also be classified
as components of this system. A failed component may
exhibit many different types of behavior, which may in-
clude, sending conflicting, spurious or clearly false infor-
mation. This sort of problem was expressed abstractly by
Lamport [8], as the Byzantine Generals Problem (BGP).
The best way to conceptualize the BGP is to use the
example of an army poised for attack [8]. The army is
comprised of several divisions, each commanded by a gen-
eral. Having sent out observers the general must decide
on a course of action. This must be a collective decision
based on all the available facts and played out by each
division in unison. However in some cases there may be
a traitor.
While broadcasting guarantees the recipient of a mes-
sage that everyone else has received the same message.
This guarantee may no longer exist in a setting in which
communications are peer-to-peer and some of the people
within this network are traitors. In this type of setting
a Byzantine agreement offers a means to achieving the
required form of broadcast.
Byzantine Agreements are used widely as a method for
fault tolerance in distributed systems. We have outlined
the original literature of Lamport [8, 9] and Pease [13] so
that we can explore the area in greater depth. The use of
a more formalized version of the BGP was investigated in
section 3, using the developments of Pease and Lamport
[8, 13]. Furthermore we also adapt a approximate solu-
tion to the infinite message case of the Weak Byzantine
Generals Problem of Lamport [9].
We go on to develop the use of Byzantine Agreements
(BA), in a secure communication environment. Linial
[10], provides us with a wide ranging insight into how
BA’s can be used to establish protocols for secure com-
munication. We also define current cryptographic meth-
ods in terms of a BA and examine how these methods
compare to information theoretic protocols.
We move on to using BA’s in an insecure environment,
where communication channels can become faulty. Das-
gupta’s [5], work on agreement using faulty interfaces,
develops an analogy very close to that of channels which
may become unreliable.
2 BA in Secure Communication
The Byzantine Agreement problem is one of a collection
of more general problems in Fault-tolerance. In this sec-
tion we apply the work of [3, 2, 7, 10], in an attempt to
further our case for applying Byzantine Agreements to
secure communication and fault detection.
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2.1 Traitor-tolerance Under Secure Com-
munication
Before we begin we need to make two assumptions about
the behavior of traitors. There are two types of bad player
in this model, curious or malicious.
• Curious players try to extract as much information
from the fringes of operation as possible from ex-
changes from good players and themselves. This
raises the problem of information leaks, and trying
to prevent curious players from taking advantage of
this source information.
• Malicious act in a manner which can directly under-
mine the integrity of a network.
There are two models for how good players hide informa-
tion:
• Information-theoretic: Secure communication
channels exist between every two agents. No third
party can gain any information by eavesdropping
messages sent on any such channel. A good example
of this sort of protection against a man in the middle
attack such as this, is the use of quantum cryptogra-
phy over fibre optic cables.
• Bounded Computational Resources/Crypto-
graphic set-up: It is assumed in these models
that the participants have restricted computational
power. For example:
– Secure message passing: This case is only of
interest over Insecure channels and/or if the
bounds on computational power allow the sim-
ulation of a secure communication channel.
– The “and” function: Two players have a single
input bit each, and they need to compute the
logical “and” of these two bits. Secure channels
do not help in this problem, but this task can
be performed in the cryptographic set-up.
– The millionaires’ problem: There is a protocol
which allows players P1 and P2 to find out which
of the integers x1, x2 is bigger, without P1 find-
ing out any other information about x2 and vice
versa? This is only interesting if there is a com-
monly known upper bound on both x1, x2.
– Game playing without a Grand Designer:
Barany and Fu¨redi [1] show how n ≥ 4 players
may safely play any noncooperative game in the
absence of a grand designer, even if one of the
players is trying to cheat. As Linial outlines in
[10], this result can be strengthened, so that this
condition will hold even if as many as b (n−1)3 c
players deviate from the rules of the game.
– Secure Voting: Consider n voters, each of whom
casts one yes/no vote on an issue. At the end
of the voting round we may ask that the tally
be made known to all players. This observa-
tion should be taken into account in making the
formal definition of “no information leaks are
allowed”.
Based on Linial’s work [10], we investigate the two main
models for bad players’ behavior.
Model 1: Curious Players
• Store all messages seen throughout the duration of
the protocol.
• Traitors collaborate to extract as much information
as possible from their records of a run.
• The behavior of players who are said to be curious.
• We must impose a No Information Leak clause on
this model, so that no information other than that
collected by the traitors as a group is stored to un-
dermine the network.
Model 2: Malicious Players
A more demanding model assumes that nothing with re-
gard to the behavior of the traitors as in the Byzan-
tine Agreement problem. In this situation we are more
concerned with the correctness of the computation is in
jeopardy. If we were to compute f(x1, . . . , xn) and some
player i refuses to reveal xi (which is known only to him),
then any calculation dependant on this is corruptible.
Furthermore if player i intentionally sends an incorrect
value for xi, they would be doing so with the desire of
being undetected. If it were possible to relax the re-
quirement for no information leak, then correctness can in
principle be achieved through the following commitment
mechanism:
• If each player places their value for xi in an envelope
then all envelopes are publicly opened and referred
to be locally threaded.
• We can evaluate |f(x1, . . . , xn)| − f(xi, x˜i)| < ε so
that if xi is not valid we can draw from the set
z1, . . . , zn for a valid response.
Thus we can perform these tasks without using physical
envelopes. Given appropriate means for concealing in-
formation, as well as an upper bound on the number of
faults, it is possible to compute both correctly and with-
out leaking any information.
The type of protocols that may be applied can be
classed as follows:
• A specification of the task which is to be performed.
• An upper boundm for the number of unreliable play-
ers out of a total of n.
• The assumed nature of the traitors; curious or mali-
cious.
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• The countermeasures available: Either secure com-
munication lines or a bound on the disloyal players’
computational power.
The main result of this section, is that if the number
m < ∞ of traitors is properly bounded, so that both
modes of deceit (curious and malicious) with two guaran-
tees of safety (secure lines and restricted computational
power) enable for correct and leak free computation. We
must now state how these results applies to our problem
from Linial [10]:
Case (1): Given f : f1, . . . , fn, in n variables and players
P1, . . . , Pn which communicate via secure channels then
each player Pi, holds an input xi known only to them.
There exists a protocol which is leak free against any
proper minority of curious players. Given a coalition of
players S ⊆ {1, . . . , n} with |S| ≤ b (n−1)2 c, where every
communique is computationally based on the set of mes-
sages passed to any Pj(j ∈ S) can also be computed given
only the xj and fj(x1, . . . , xn) for j ∈ S.
The computation of f(x1, . . . , xn) is not guaranteed to
force traitors to supply their correct input values. The
best that can be hoped for is that traitors can be made to
commit on input values, which are independent of the in-
put reliable players. After such a commitment stage, the
computation of f proceeds correctly and without leaking
information. In any case a traitors refusal to supply an
input, will result in the default value. That is, the proto-
col computes a value f(y1, . . . , yn) so that yi = xi for all
i /∈ S and where the yj(j ∈ S) are chosen independently
of xi(i /∈ S).
The same results hold if the functions fj are replaced
by probability distributions and instead of computing
the functions we need to sample according to these
distributions. We should also restate that the bounds on
this theorem are indeed tight.
Case (2): Assume that one-way trapdoor permutations
exist, p1356 [10]. If we modify Case (1) as follows we can
use the following:
Channels are not secure, but agents are probabilistic,
polynomial-time Turing Machines. Similar conclusions
hold with the bound b (n−1)2 c and b (n−1)3 c, replaced by
by n− 1 and b (n−1)2 c respectively. Again the bounds are
tight and the results hold also for sampling distributions
rather than for evaluation of functions [10].
2.2 Protocols for Secure Collective Com-
munication
Given a set of n agents and an additional trusted party
which may be referred to as a grand designer [6], there
are various goals that can be achieved in terms of correct,
reliable and leak-free communication. In fact, all they
need to do is relay their input values to the party who can
compute any functions of these inputs and communicate
to every player any data desired. In broad terms, our
mission is to provide a protocol for the n parties to
achieve all the tasks in the absence of a trusted party.
The two most important instances of this general plane
are:
Privacy: If we consider a protocol for computing
f1, . . . , fn, where originally party i holds xi, the value
of the ith variable and where by the protocol’s end it
is known that fi(x1, . . . , xn)(1 ≤ i ≤ n). The protocol
is t-private if every quantity which is computable from
the information viewed throughout the protocol’s run by
any coalition of |S| players, is also computable from their
own inputs and outputs.
Fault tolerance: The protocol is t-resilient if for every
coalition S of no more than t parties such that |S| ≤ t
and the protocol computes a value f(y1, . . . , yn) so that
yi = xi for all i /∈ S and so that yj(j ∈ S) are chosen
independent on the value of xi(i /∈ S).
We shall now express the results which hold under the
assumption that traitors are coeducationally restricted.
Theorem 2.1. Every function of n variables can be com-
puted by n agents which communicate via secure chan-
nels in a b (n−1)2 c-private way. Similarly, a protocol ex-
ists which is both b (n−1)3 c−private and b (n−1)3 c−resilient,
where the computational bounds are tight.
The are four protocols to describe according to the model
(cryptographic or information-theoretic), where bad play-
ers are assumed curious or malicious. All four protocols
follow one general pattern, which is explained below. We
review the solution for the case in reasonable detail and
then indicate how it is modified to deal with the other
three solutions.
Since circuits can simulate Turing Machines, the prob-
lem becomes more structured, when rather than dealing
with a general function f the discussion focuses on a cir-
cuit which computes it with-out loss of generality. In
Goldreich [7], the idea that players collectively follow the
computation carried out by the circuit moving from one
gate to the next, but where each of the partial values com-
puted in the circuit, is encoded as a secret shared by the
players. To implement this idea one needs to be able to:
• Assign input values to the variables in a shared way.
• Perform the elementary field operations on values
which are kept as shared secrets. The outcome should
again be kept as a shared secret.
• If, at the computation’s conclusion, each player P is
to possess a certain value computed throughout, then
all shares of this secret are to be handed to him by
all other players.
In Linial [10], the 2nd item is investigated at greater
depth, and we shall now follow his reasoning. If we recon-
sider the information-theoretic, curious player scenario,
we need to carry out our investigation in the following
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manner. Secrets are shared using a digital signature, and
we need to be able to add and multiply field elements
which are kept as secrets shared by all players.
Schamir [16], goes on to describe the importance of
dealing with the degree being too high, which thus needs
to be reduced. This is achieved by truncating high-order
terms in g (g is the secret). Letting h be the polynomial
obtained by deleting all terms in g of degree exceeding m
(m is the number of players). If a (and respectively b)
is the vector whose ith coordinate is g(αi) [respectively
h(αi)] the there is a matrix C depending only on the αi
such that b = aC. Thus a degree reduction, may be per-
formed in a shared way, as follows. Each Pj knows g(αj)
and for every i we need to compute h(αi) =
∑
j ci,jg(αj)
and inform Pi. Now, Pj computes ci,jg(αj) and deals it
as a shared secret among all players. Everyone then sums
his shares for ci,jg(αj) over all j, thus obtaining his share
of h(αi) =
∑
ci,jg(αj), which becomes a shared secret.
We should recall from both Schamir and Linial [10, 16],
that if sv are secrets, and sµv is the share of sv held by
player Pµ then his share of
∑
sv, is
∑
sµv . So each player
passes to Pi the share of h(αi), so now Pi can reconstruct
the actual h(αi). Now free term of g which is the same as
the free term of h, is kept as a shared secret, as needed.
This establishes the b (n−1)2 c−privacy part of the pre-
vious theorem. The condition that n > 2m is implicit.
Linial [10] also states that the more curious players can-
not be tolerated by any protocol follows from Chor’s result
that it is impossible to compute the logical “or” function
for two players [4]. Having dealt with curious players,
we shall simply refer the reader to Linial’s treatment of
malicious players, (Linial [10]).
However we must state two important results from
Linial which are directly related to our secure commu-
nication theme for this paper. Besides the corruption of
shares, there is also a possibility that bad players who are
supposed to share information with others will fail to do
so. This difficulty is countered by using a verifiable secret
sharing scheme [12, 16].
Secondly themalicious case states that only n ≥ 3m+1
can be dealt with in this way. This follows the Byzan-
tine Agreement protocol from Section 3. So if players are
not restricted to communicate via a secure two-party line
[10], but can also broadcast messages, fact can increase
resiliency from b (n−1)3 c to b (n−1)2 c.
3 BA and Insecure Communica-
tion Channels
Insecure communications channels also provide challenges
when trying to achieve agreement amongst a group of
players. We shall use the modified version of the BGP to
find agreement amongst a set of players who are reliable
but may encounter faulty interfaces [5]. This is analogous
to a faulty or insecure communication channels. In this
section we will assume that a faulty channel can not be
relied upon as being secure. We consider three types of
faults, namely message corruption, message loss, and spu-
rious message generation. A spurious message in our set
of circumstances would be regarded as a traitor generat-
ing some alternate set of messages to distribute across the
network.
We shall use Dasgupta’s [5], variant of the Byzantine
generals problem, where agents who represent traitors are
fully operation. However the disloyal agents interfaces
with the communication network may be faulty, causing
them to send erroneous messages throughout the network.
This model can be briefly described by the following:
• Each agent has one or more communication devices
available.
• In order to send a message, the source agent passes
the message to the appropriate communications de-
vice.
• A channel receives a message from the first agent and
delivers it to the second agent.
• One or more devices may be faulty.
• The agents themselves are reliable. However an agent
with one or more faulty devices is called the traitor.
We will use the conventions as outlined in Dasgupta [5]
and categorize the types of faults that are possible in this
model as follows:
• m/m′ fault: The device receives a message m and
communicates a different message m′ to the other
agent.
• m/θ fault: The device receives a messagem and loses
the message.
• θ/m′ fault: The device generates a spurious message
m and loses it.
These protocols are used to analyze the Byzantine Agree-
ment in the presence of faults. Throughout this report we
will make the assumption that is used in Dasgupta [5] and
in the were all inter-agent communication is synchronous.
So if we assume that all three types of faults are pos-
sible, then the agreement problem reduces to the Byzan-
tine Generals Problem such that more than two thirds
of the participants are required to be loyal. We should
also note that if only m/m′ faults are possible, then the
agreement problem becomes trivial. In Dasgupta [5], a
protocol which achieves agreement in one round is pre-
sented. Furthermore Dasgupta also shows that spurious
messages causes the main difficulty in reaching some sort
of agreement. If m/m′ and m/φ are the only possible
faults, then Dasgupta, asserts that agreement is possible
irrespective of the number of traitors within the network.
Using the protocol outlined in Dasgupta we can use the
proof of n < 3m+1 to argue that these types of faults do
not require interactive consistency.
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3.1 Agreement Under Faults
3.1.1 Agreement Under m/m′, m/φ and φ/m
Faults
In Dasgupta [5] it can be seen that if m/m′, m/φ and
φ/m faults are all possible then the agreement is logically
equivalent to the BGP. We will now follow the work of
Dasgupta and examine the ways in which an agent may
fault in the original BGP and demonstrate possible equiv-
alent situations in this model:
1) A traitor receives a message and communicates some
other message. This is equivalent to the m/m′ fault.
2) A traitor receives a message and transmits nothing
(m/φ fault).
3) A traitor receives no message and transmits a spuri-
ous one (φ/m′ fault).
Having observed that it is easy to see how agreements
under m/m′, m/φ and φ/m faults is as difficult as the
original BGP. We should also note that the reverse is eas-
ier to see as the original model asserts that the agent
could be faulty. We shall now conclude this aspect of
Dasgupta’s work by proposing a short theorem with an
easy proof.
Theorem 3.1. If m/m′, m/φ and φ/m faults are all pos-
sible, then agreement is possible in m+1 rounds amongst
at least 3m+ 1 agents.
Proof. Follows from the equivalence with the original
Byzantine agreement problem. Agreement can be reached
in m+1 rounds using the unforgeable (oral) message pro-
tocol of Lamport in [8].
3.2 The Importance of m/φ and φ/m′
Faults
Protocol for m/m’-only Model:
1) The General decides whether to attack or retreat:
• If the decision is to retreat the general remains
silent.
• If the decision is to attack, the general sends a
message to all lieutenant.
2) If a member of the network (other than the general)
receives any message in the first round it decides to
attack, otherwise it decides to retreat.
Theorem 3.2. The protocol for the m/m’ only model
achieves agreement in one round.
Proof. We shall outline a slightly different approach to
that in Dasgupta [5], and separate the two cases in a
more formal way.
1) Suppose the commanding general decides to retreat.
Since the general and his Lieutenant are correct, the
general does not attempt to send any message. Since
φ/m′ problems are ruled out, none of the other mem-
bers receive any message from the general and there-
fore all of the lieutenant retreat.
2) Now if we assume that the general decides to attack,
then the entire network is correct. The general at-
tempts to send a message to every other member of
his forces. Since m/φ faults are ruled out, each of
the Lieutenant receive some message (which may or
may not be complete) from the general, and decide
to attack.
This result shows that if the Lieutenant’s are them-
selves correct, then the main difficulty in achieving agree-
ment is in the presence of m/φ and φ/m′ faults. We must
also observe that the absence of φ/m′ and m/φ faults,
the generals with faulty interfaces also reach the same
consensus.
3.3 Agreement Under m/m′ and m/φ
Faults
In this section we consider a communication sys-
tem/scenario which does allow φ/m. We will consider
this case out of special interest. Quite often network in-
terfaces become faulty only if sensitized when an attempt
is made to send messages through them. we present the
algorithm as outlined in [5], which achieves agreement in
at most n + 1 rounds where n is the number of generals
with faulty interfaces.
In this protocol the decision to retreat is modelled by
silence and attack is communicated by sending a single
message to each participant. The protocol among n
generals is recursively described by the following.
Algorithm M(0, n).
1) The Commanding General, communicates a message
to every other general if it has decided to attack.
Otherwise it remains silent.
2) Each of the generals, Gi, acts as follows. If Gi has
already decided, then it ignores all messages. If Gi
has not yet decided, then it decides to attack if it re-
ceives any message from the commander, and decides
to retreat otherwise.
Algorithm M(k, n), k > 0
1) The commanding General communicates a message
to every other general if it has decided to attack.
Otherwise he remains quite.
2) Each of the other generals, Gi, act as follows.
• If Gi has already decided, then it will ignore all
messages.
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• If Gi has not yet decided, then it decides to
attack if it receives any message from the com-
manding general, and remains undecided other-
wise.
• General Gi now acts as the commander in algo-
rithm M(k − 1, n − 1) among the other n − 2
generals.
As we have seen in both Lamport’s algorithm [8] and
in Dasgupta [5], the protocol starts when the general
takes a decision on whether to attack or retreat, and ini-
tiates the protocol acting as the commander in algorithm
M(k, n). The following results establish that in the pres-
ence of m/m′ and m/φ faults only, Algorithm M(k, n)
achieves Byzantine Agreement in a cluster of n agents,
among these only k agents may have faulty interfaces.
Thus Byzantine agreement is possible in this model irre-
spective of the number of agents that have a faulty inter-
face.
Lemma 3.3. If the instigator of the M(k, n) algorithm
decides to retreat, than all other processors agree to re-
treat.
Proof. If the instigator decides to retest, then he sends no
message in M(k, n). Since φ/m′ faults are ruled out, as
none of the agents receive any message, and therefore send
none in return. Thus in round k+1, when M(0, n− k) is
initiated, so that all agents, including those with a faulty
interface decide to retreat.
In this proposed algorithm of Dasgupta [5], all agents
but for the instigator, an agent sends out messages only if
it receives a message in the previous round. Thus except
for the messages sent out by the instigator, each message
sent out by an agent is preceded (Causally) by the a re-
ceipt of a message by that agent.
Definition 3.4. If an agent sends out a message m′ upon
receiving a message m, then m′ is referred to as being ca-
sually preceded by m. This relation is denoted m ≺ m′.
Furthermore we can say that the casual precedence is tran-
sitive. Messages which causally precede a message m as
being ancestors of m. We refer to the set of agents consti-
tuting the sender of m and the sender of all its ancestors
as the sender-set of m.
Lemma 3.5. If the first agent with all reliable interfaces
reaches a decision to attack, then the decision is made in
round j, where j ≤ k, then by the end of round j + 1, all
agents with reliable interfaces agree to attack.
Proof. When an agent with reliable interfaces receives
a message m, it decides to attack, and in the following
round it communicates messages to all the other agents
which is not a member of the sender-set of m. If P is the
first agent with reliable interfaces to receive a message m
(and decides to attack). Thus none of the agents in the
sender-set of m have all reliable interfaces. Therefore, in
the next round P sends messages to all agents with re-
liable interfaces, and each agent decides individually to
attack.
Lemma 3.6. If no agent with reliable interfaces reaches a
decision to attack by round k, then each agent with reliable
interfaces will decide to retreat in round k + 1.
Proof. Dasgupta [5] shows that if none of the agents will
all reliable interfaces receive a message, and decide to at-
tack by round k. Then none of the agents receive a mes-
sage in round k+1, therefore all of them decide to retreat.
The sender set of a message received in round k + 1, has
k + 1 agents, at least one of which must have reliable in-
terfaces. That agent must receive a message by round k.
However this is a contradiction, since we have been given
the information that the agents with all reliable interfaces
have received a message by round k.
Theorem 3.7. If m/m′ and m/φ are the only faults
are possible, then it is possible to reach Byzantine Agree-
ment in a cluster of n agents of which at most k are
faulty/disloyal, irrespective of the ratio of k and n. There-
fore Agreement can be reached in k + 1 rounds.
Proof. We will use Dasgupta’s proof, to show that the al-
gorithm M(k, n) achieves this agreement. If n − k ≤ 1,
then the proof is self explanatory. Thus if we consider
the other case where the instigator decides to retreat. By
Lemma 7.3, all agents agree to retreat in round k+1. We
shall now consider now the cases when the instigator de-
cides to attack. If we look at the two possible cases, which
depend on whether or not the interfaces of the instigator
are all correct or not. We shall follow Dasgupta [5], and
treat each of these cases separately.
1) The Instigator is reliable. Thus if all interfaces of
the instigator are reliable and the instigator decides
to attack, then it is successfully sends a message to
all other agents in the first round.
2) The Instigator has faulty interfaces. If the instigator
has one ore more faulty interfaces and the instiga-
tor decides to attack, then it may succeed in sending
messages to some and none to others. In this case
we need to follow Dasgupta [5] and prove that at the
end of the k + 1 round, agents with all reliable in-
terfaces reach a common decision. Thus by Lemma
7.5, if an agent with all reliable interfaces receives
a message by round j (j ≤ k), then by the end of
round j + 1, agents with all reliable interfaces reach
a common decision to attack. However on the other
hand, by Lemma 7.6, if no agent with all reliable in-
terfaces receive any message by round k, then agents
with all reliable interfaces reach a common decision
to retreat. Therefore, even if the instigator has one
or more faulty interfaces, agents with all reliable in-
terfaces reach a common decision.
4 Results and Conclusion
This investigation has lead us to the more formal design
of secure communications networks which are able to deal
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with both secure and insecure channels. Maintaining the
resiliency of the secure network is achievable given the use
of a secret sharing scheme, the ability to broadcast as well
as using two-part secure lines. With our improvement to
the treatment of m/φ and φ/m faults, the security of a
insecure communication channel can also be improved.
Given the 3m+1 condition for insecure networks and the
residency improvement of secure channels to [(n− 1)/2] a
new design paradigm can be applied to networks of agents.
Much work needs to be done on refining methods for
obtaining Byzantine Agreements [11, 15]. Further inves-
tigations into BA’s could concentrate on:
• The correlation between the median voter theorem,
a social choice setting and BA’s.
• BA’s and their use in Cluster networks.
• BA’s for establishing communication protocols with
peers that are not always available. (wandering
solider problem [11])
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